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Suppose one claims that to reason well is to reason in accord with logic, that is, following Frege, 
the laws of truth. According to David Godden, some might argue that since one cannot reason in 
accord with logic, one cannot be obligated to reason in accord with logic, and so the norms of 
reasoning cannot be accordance with logic. Suppose instead that one claims that to reason well is 
to be appropriately responsive to reasons, to appraise “the strengths of one’s reasons, and 
adhere… to a standard of evidence proportionalism whereby one accords the degrees of 
commitment to one’s views with the strength of the evidence for them” [emphasis in original] 
(Pinto as cited in Godden, p. 5). Again some might argue that since one cannot be appropriately 
responsive to reasons, one cannot be obligated to be properly responsive to reasons, and so the 
norms of reasoning cannot be being appropriately responsive to reasons. Godden ends his paper 
by suggesting that the practices and technologies of argumentation theory expand our reasoning 
capabilities, for example, expand what we can keep track of in terms of consistency and 
consequence and so expand our reasoning responsibilities. He concludes that those who are 
“committed to … the picture of argumentative rationality sketched above, or the notion that at 
least some rational norms derive at least partly from logical ideals, should take heart” (p. 15). 
I have questions or challenges, though not all equally problematic, for almost every step 
in this chain of reasoning.   
First, what does it mean to reason in accord with logic? In one sense, Gilbert Harman is 
correct when he says that logic in itself is not prescriptive.  Logic just describes the laws of truth 
and there are a lot of them—a lot more than you might initially suspect. For example, there are 
laws that articulate what would happen if A, then B and B, so A were allowed as an acceptable 
inference rule. Given certain other principles the result would be an inconsistent system, but 
excluding those principles the result would be a consistent (though I suspect odd) system.  
Assuming for the moment that any individual’s actual belief set is finite, for any potential 
additional belief, there will be a logical system that holds those beliefs as truths of the system 
and allows the additional belief to also be a truth of the system. The system may or may not be 
consistent, and may have certain other odd properties, but it will exist. Hence, in the sense in 
which logic is not prescriptive, any bit of reasoning can be said to be in accord with logic (which 
is presumably contrary to the result that Harman wanted.)   
But of course we have norms of logic as well—some systems are better than others. We 
strongly prefer consistent systems to inconsistent systems. [Why? Well, one answer might be 
that inconsistent systems (combined with logical closure) explode and explosion is bad. But why 
is explosion bad? Because we, as actual reasoners, do not engage in explosion and so such 
systems cannot represent what we take to be our good reasoning? Why such reasoning is good on 
such a view, however, remains a complete mystery. Perhaps explosion is bad because explosive 
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systems do not discriminate truth from falsity and we ought/need to so discriminate? Is the 
discrimination of truth from falsity just a basic intrinsic good in no further need of explanation?] 
Sound systems are better than unsound systems. Complete systems were once desired, but Gödel 
nixed the possibility that we could have a complete system for anything close to the full domains 
over which we reason. Presumably, then we do not want our reasoning to accord with any old 
logical system, but rather with good or correct logical systems—we want to reason in accord 
with the norms of logic and it is definitely an open question what those norms are, whether we 
need to reason in accord with all of them, and what the ultimate source of the norms of logic are.   
Second, is it really true that one cannot reason in accord with logic or the norms of logic? Don’t 
we, sometimes at least, clearly reason in accord with at least some of the norms of logic? Even if 
we suppose that it is impossible, because of human frailties perhaps, for one to always reason in 
accord with the norms of logic, it would not follow that for any particular instance of reasoning 
we are not obligated to reason in that particular case in accord with the norms of logic. What if 
we predictably and systematically do not reason in accord with the norms of logic? Perhaps then 
there is a sense in which we cannot reason in accord with the norms of logic, but the empirical 
evidence falls far short. At best the evidence shows that a preponderance of, but certainly not all, 
individuals in certain circumstances predictably and systematically do not reason in accord with 
certain norms of logic. But that does not show that they cannot so reason, and certainly does not 
show that ‘we’ in general cannot so reason.  
What of Harman’s arguments against consistency and closure as rational norms?  I agree 
with Harman that a rational fallible person ought to believe at least one of his or her beliefs is 
false, but I deny the result is an inconsistent belief set. Suppose I have 1000 beliefs, each of 
which I give a 99% chance of being true—in other words I believe each of them. I should also 
believe that there is a high probability that at least one of those beliefs is mistaken—and there is 
a 99.99956% chance that at least one of those beliefs is false given that each has a 99% chance of 
being true. Of course, if I gave all of my beliefs, including the belief that one of my beliefs is 
false, a 100% chance of being true, I would be inconsistent—but no rational fallible person ought 
to attribute a 100% chance of being true to all or even most of his or her beliefs. 
Do we believe all the logical consequences of our beliefs (or at least those we are 
unwilling to give up?) Occurrently, no, but dispositionally, most likely yes. I see no obvious 
reason why logical closure cannot merely be a property of one’s dispositional belief set—it is not 
at all implausible that we are at least dispositionally committed to the logical consequences 
(mostly trivial anyway) of what we believe. Of course, in many cases the logical consequences 
of what I believe are inconsistent with other things I believe and when this is made occurrent or 
manifest to me I have the problem of revising my occurrent belief set to try to make it consistent 
again (this is just Godden’s principle of no manifest inconsistency). Of course, there are plenty 
of (consistent and closed) systems that are incapable of modeling belief set revision. But that at 
most tells me that the correct model of belief revision, if there is one, is not one of those 
systems—it does not tell me that there is no correct logical system of belief revision. 
Third, does ought implies can universally hold? Is the psychopath who cannot refrain 
from attempting to kill people thereby permitted to attempt to kill people? But if there are 
subtleties to the correct scope of the ought implies can principle, then might not those subtleties 
affect attempts to use the principle to weaken the norms of rationality? [Note that the converse of 
ought implies can is not cannot so ought not, but rather cannot, so not obligated, which is cannot 
so permitted not.] 
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Fourth, even if we were not obligated to reason in accord with the norms of logic, would 
that mean that the norms of reasoning are not accordance with the norms of logic or reason 
responsiveness?  No. The norms of rationality may just be accordance with the norms of logic or 
reason responsiveness and yet because I cannot (always) reason in accordance with the norms of 
logic or be reason responsive I many not be obligated to reason (always) in accordance with the 
norms of logic or be reason responsive—but that would just mean that I am not (always) 
obligated to reason well. [One could even keep the obligation, but aver that I am not 
blameworthy for not always fulfilling my obligations. I might be excused in some cases, say, 
because reasoning well is extremely difficult in a given situation and to the degree that it is 
difficult, I might be held less to blame for failing.][At least one of the versions of bounded 
rationality that Godden presents seems quite close to this position which makes it hard to see 
how it is a case of bounded rationality as opposed to bounded responsibility for my reasoning.] 
Fifth, is evidence proportionalism always correct? Suppose I am refereeing a soccer 
match and I am moderately confident I see a foul and so call the foul.  The reaction of both teams 
indicates otherwise. The offending team objects strenuously; even the receiving team gives 
plenty of shaking of heads and wry smiles and apologies to the other team to indicate they too do 
not think there was a foul. I was only moderately confident to begin with based on my visual 
evidence and I now have plenty of contrary evidence. Should I reduce my confidence in whether 
there was a foul? Absolutely not. If I do, two very bad things are likely to happen. First, I will try 
to replay the situation in my head to see if I really was wrong. The result is that I will be focusing 
less on the game as it currently is and so decrease my chances of getting subsequent calls correct.  
Second, for future situations in which I am paying attention I will overthink what I see, perhaps 
by trying to replay it a couple times in my head before making the call. The result again will 
actually be a decrease in the number of correct calls. In other words, given the sort of 
psychological agent I am (along with plenty of other people) being an evidence proportionalist 
will make me a worse epistemic agent in this case (and a worse referee). I will be a better 
epistemic agent and get more of the future calls correct and so be a better referee, if I in fact, 
ignore the contrary evidence or at least not let the contrary evidence adjust my confidence in 
having made the correct call. 
Granted, after the match there will be plenty of time to debrief and evaluate the evidence 
again (and get more evidence from the other officials, or the match assessor, or even video replay 
if available).  But that just shows that what is rational to believe and do in a given situation may 
vary from what it is rational to believe or do upon reflection. And if there is a difference between 
in situ rationality and reflective rationality, then one may begin to wonder the degree to which 
those appealing to logic and those arguing in favor of bounded rationality are arguing about the 
same thing.  
Sixth, and finally, does the appeal to the practices and technologies of argumentation 
theory help resist what Godden sees as the potential weakening of the norms of rationality?  
Perhaps, but not, I suspect, the way Godden argues it does. 
 What makes using the practices and techniques better than not using them at least in 
some situations? How could I tell that diagramming an argument or performing a pragma-
dialectical analysis improves my reasoning capabilities? [By the way trying to diagram my 
reasoning or to perform a pragma-dialetical analysis of my conversation with the objecting 
captain would not be helpful in the middle of the soccer pitch.] To answer those questions I 
would have to know what is better/worse reasoning is and that can presumably only be done 
relative to the satisfaction of some norms/standards. Now if the standards Godden appeals to are 
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conformity with logic or reason responsiveness, then those who challenge those standards will 
cry foul, since appealing to the very standards he was trying to defend is question-begging.   
The bounded rationality argument appealing to ought implies can is highly suspect and I 
recommend not playing within the confines of that argument and trying to push our capabilities 
towards being able to satisfy more rigorous standards. I am not doubting that the practices and 
technologies of argumentation theory can expand our capabilities, the same way any tool can 
expand our capabilities (and so might expand our responsibilities). But to tell that those practices 
and technologies are in fact improving (rather than hurting) my reasoning capabilities requires 
already having norms of reasoning in place—norms that must be independent of my capabilities 
if it is going to make sense to say that a change in my capabilities makes me better (or worse) 
able to satisfy the norms. The defenders of conformity to the norms of logic or to reason 
responsive should not take heart merely from the fact that improving our capabilities might make 
us better able to satisfy those norms, but rather from the fact that those who would make the 
constitution of the norms of reasoning involve the capabilities of the reasoner face a very serious 
challenge—they have no way of telling whether a change in one’s capabilities constitutes an 
improvement or decline in one’s reasoning. But isn’t that what we all do for a living? 
 
 
 
 
